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Abstract
Can a bank increase its prot by subsidizing inactivity? This paper
suggests this may occur, due to the presence of hidden information, in
a monopolistic credit market. Rather than o¤ering credit in a pooling
contract, a monopolist bank can sort borrowers through an appropri-
ate subsidy to inactivity. Under some conditions, sorting may avoid
the collapse of the market and increases the welfare of everybody. The
bank increases its prots, good borrowers benet from lower interest
rates and bad potential borrowers from the subsidy. The subsidy
policy however implies a cross subsidy between contracts and this is
possible only under monopoly.
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1 Introduction
Can a bank increase its prot by giving awaymoney? This paper suggests this
may occur, due to hidden information, in a monopolistic credit market. The
result arises whenever the entry of worse, surplus-reducing, borrowers can
be avoided by use of a subsidy to inactivity that the bank itself should pay.
We show that under some conditions, notably a share of good entrepreneurs
that is neither too large nor too small, the proposed subsidy is protable
for the bank. Specically, when the share of good entrepreneurs is very
large, bad entrepreneurs do not impact that much on prot in a pooling
contract and therefore the subsidy is not protable. Instead when the share
of good entrepreneurs is too small there is no room for protable contracts
anyway (pooling or separating). When the subsidy policy is protable, it
is also Pareto improving and strictly increases the welfare of each agent.
Under some conditions this policy is the only one delivering positive prots
and therefore it also avoids the overall collapse of a lemonscredit market
(Akerlof, 1970). Moreover the ability to grant the subsidy is clearly specic
to a monopolistic credit market and therefore the realized surplus is always
larger under monopoly than under competition.
The literature on the credit market has already discussed the possibility
that a subsidy to stay out might increase welfare. Most contributions in
this eld generally suggest that a public subsidy may improve on the private
equilibrium (see for example de Meza and Webb, 2000; Gruner, 2003). Reito
(2011) considers both private and public interventions. In his paper, entre-
preneurs may decide to join in a group and voluntarily collect and use their
endowments as collateral to allow lenders to separate good from bad types.
If their wealth is not enough, then government intervention is needed. Our
idea, instead, is that a monopolistic bank itself can implement the subsidy
policy and increase its prots.
2 A simple model
There is a large number, N , of potential entrepreneurs, each endowed with
one of two possible projects, a and b. Both projects require a xed investment
of L, but di¤er in their nal expected gross (and net) return. Project a, the
good one, succeeds with probability pa and yields ya. Project b, the bad one,
yields in case of success a return yb > ya, but with a probability pb < pa:
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Both projects deliver zero revenues in case of failure. Assume that project a
has a positive net value, while project b a negative one, that is:
pbyb < L < paya;
Accordingly, bad projects should not be undertaken, from a social perspec-
tive, as they produce less than the resources employed. But because of limited
liability and asymmetric information they can still be nanced at a common
contract with better entrepreneurs and benet from an implicit cross subsidy.
Potential entrepreneurs have no endowment, so they are forced to ask for
outside nance. There is a single lender/bank with all the contractual power
and trying to extract all possible surplus from its prospective borrowers. As
regards the informational structure, each rm knows its own quality while
the bank only knows the proportion of good types, . As in Innes (1991),
assume that the nal returns are imperfectly observable in the sense that the
bank cannot verify the actual output produced. In this case, the optimal
form of nancing is the debt contract1. We assume universal risk neutrality
and an innitely elastic supply of funds at a risk-free interest rate normalized
to 0. A nancial contract species the xed loan size, L, and the sum that
the rm has to repay if the nal project is successful, R2. As no endowment
is available, the standard theory predicts that the bank will o¤er a pooling
contract that species no collateral requirement and a repayment chosen to
reap all the surplus. For a given pooling repayment sum R, rmsprots are
i(R) = pi(yi  R); i = a; b;
where a borrower type-i accepts the contract if R  yi. Hence if R > ya,
only bad rms apply. The best choice for the bank is setting R = ya and
proposing it as a the pooling contract if and only if pool > 0:
  L  pbya
ya(pa   pb) = pool: (1)
If the proportion of good types is not high enough, that is if  < pool, all
rms are credit rationed. In both cases the equilibrium is clearly ine¢ cient
1As pointed out by de Meza and Webb (1987), if the nal returns were perfectly
observable, the bank could reach the optimum by o¤ering a share nance contract.
2With full information, the optimal contractual terms would be R = ya for type a and
no contract for the ine¢ cient type b. If a accepts the contract, the monopolistic bank is
able to attain its rst-best prot, paya   L (that is the projects expected value minus
investment costs).
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from a social standpoint as project a (only) delivers a positive net present
value.
Now suppose that the lender can make a transfer, G, to induce bad types
to stay out of the market. In this case the bank maximizes per-loan prots
as follows:
maxpaR G(1  )  L (2)
with the following incentive compatibility constraints
ICa : pa(ya  R) G  0; and (3)
ICb : pb(yb  R) G  0:
Solving ICa and ICb, the repayment R and the transfer required G must
satisfy:
R  paya   pbyb
pa   pb ; (4)
G  papb(yb   ya)
pa   pb :
Of course the maximizing values of R* and G* are given by the equality
constraints in (4). Substituting in (2) we obtain3
sep = paya  G*  L: (5)
Proposition 1 Under conditions on the parameters values, there exists dis-
tributions of entrepreneurs (e.g. shares of good ones in the market, ) for
which the subsidy policy may be protable for the bank. When this occurs
the subsidy policy must be Pareto welfare improving on a pure interest-rate
contract.
Let us compare both policies to nd the range of  values such that
sep  pool. We nd that a necessary and su¢ cient condition is that
  L(pa   pb) + p
2
bya   papbyb
(L  pbya)(pa   pb) : (6)
3See the appendix.
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Equation (6) shows that the separating policy is protable in general for
comparatively low values of . Intuitively this is plausible: when the propor-
tion of risky entrepreneurs is relatively small, the best policy for the bank
is to accept their presence in the borrowerspool. In this case, bad types
will not impact too much on prots. Instead, when  is smaller, a subsidy
to keep them out may make sense. Now dene  as the threshold value for
which the subsidy is more protable. Clearly, condition (6) is relevant only
if banks prot is positive at . It is pool  0 when
  L  pbya
ya(pa   pb) ; (7)
while it is sep  0 when4
  papb(yb   ya)
(paya   L)(pa   pb) =
G
(paya   L) : (8)
We dene sep as the threshold value for which condition (8) is satis-
ed. To ensure that the subsidy policy is protable we need the additional
condition sep  . We show that it is true if and only if5
L(pbyb + paya   L)  pbybpaya
L(pbya + payb   L)  pbybpaya 
pb
pa
: (9)
The term on the left-hand side of (9) is larger the lower is the di¤erence
between the projects. The term on the right-hand side is smaller the larger
is the di¤erence in the probabilities. Note that the repayment sum under the
subsidy policy is lower than that under the pooling policy (this is a necessary
condition for the ICa). This implies that good types are necessarily better
o¤ under the subsidy policy. For ICb, this is true also for bad types and
clearly, from (6), for the bank as well. Hence the subsidy policy is Pareto
improving. QED.
Proposition 2 Under a utilitarian welfare function the subsidy policy, when
it is protable for the bank, is the only one allowing full realization of potential
surplus.
4See the appendix.
5See the appendix.
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Potential surplus, W , in this market is the net surplus from the a-projects
for any :
W = N(paya   L) (10)
Considering that for  < sep; no credit contract is o¤ered, for sep 
  ; the subsidy-contracts are o¤ered, and for  > ; only the pooling
contract is o¤ered, the realized surplus in the three situations is respectively:
W = 0 for  < sep
W = N(paya   L) for sep     (10)
W = N(paya + (1  )pbyb   L) for  > 
The potential surplus is realized only under the subsidy policy. QED:
Proposition 3 A competitive credit market can never achieve the potential
surplus. For any value of ;the realized surplus is (weakly) lower than the
monopoly one.
A subsidy policy, necessarily requiring a cross-subsidy between contracts,
can never be implemented in a competitive credit market. Hence the only
contract available for banks is the pooling one. Banks will only o¤er credit
for  > pool. And even in this case the pooling contract will be o¤ered with
realized welfare:
W = 0 for  < pool (11)
W = N(paya + (1  )pbyb   L) for  > pool
QED:
Proposition 4 For a range of parameters values, a subsidy to inactivity
can avoid the collapse of the credit market.
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An alternative way to look at the problem is to analyze the cases where
the separating policy is protable while the pooling one is not. For this to be
true, the share of good borrowers in a separating equilibrium must be lower
than the threshold in case of pooling, i.e.,
sep < pool (12)
which is true when6:
L  pbyb
L  pbya >
L
paya
(13)
This condition is more likely to be satised the smaller is the di¤erence
between yb and ya, and the larger is the surplus of the good project. When-
ever (13) holds, there exist values of  such that the separating policy is
protable while the pooling policy is not. Note that this case is relevant
since the subsidy policy, by enlarging the contract space, avoids the collapse
of the credit market. It is immediate that when  < pool, adverse selection
normally produces the standard lemonsproblem and no standard contract
could be o¤ered without the subsidy. Besides, in this case the subsidy policy
is again Pareto improving. QED
3 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have shown that under some conditions, a monopolistic
credit market may benet from the enforcement of a policy subsidizing inac-
tivity of the worse borrowers. The use of a subsidy (and the interest rate) as a
sorting device allows the bank to o¤er credit only to good quality borrowers,
thus increasing its prot. Separation necessarily implies a lower interest rate
on credit. Worse borrowers enjoy the subsidy which, for incentive compat-
ibility, must leave them with the same satisfaction as the separating credit
contract. Note that by construction this latter contract, in practice a level of
repayment, is necessarily better than the one o¤ered in the no-subsidy con-
tract. Hence when the conditions for protability of the subsidy policy are
met, the policy is also Pareto improving, and indeed it is the only policy al-
lowing full realization of surplus under a utilitarian welfare function. This is
in stark contrast with models of separation attained through collateral, where
6See the appendix.
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the use of collateral is actually a dead-weight cost for society as a whole, and
generally decreases aggregate welfare (Coco, 2000). Note that the source of
the overall increase in welfare is the fact that surplus-destroying projects are
not carried out in equilibrium under the subsidy policy. Another interesting
feature of this model is that under some conditions (e.g. for some values
of ) the subsidy policy is the only one avoiding total collapse of the credit
market. Finally note that in a competitive credit market the subsidy policy
is unavailable. The joint o¤er of the subsidy and contract is possible only for
a pure monopolist (or a perfect cartel). Hence paradoxically a competitive
market would collapse for a wider range of values of :And anyway, even
if banks were able to grant loans, it could never prevent welfare-destroying
entrepreneurs from carrying out their projects.
Of course the implementation of this policy meets some limits in the pos-
sibility that, enticed by the possibility of gaining the subsidy, any individual
would apply for a loan. The subsidy thus would increase endogenously the
share of would-be entrepreneurs without a proper project in the market.
However the description of the credit market above is necessarily a simplied
one. A basic evaluation on the investment project, possibly able to sort out
the fake projects, is preliminarly performed at any lending institution.
Another limit of the analysis, but also an interesting feature, is the as-
sumption of monopolistic banking. Although possibly unsuitable for most
part of the developed world, this assumption seems more tenable in develop-
ing countries and even less densely populated areas in the developed world.
Several past contributions have challenged the assumption of perfect com-
petition in banking due to barriers to entry, structural regulation and sunk
costs7. Moreover some more recent empirical investigations report evidence
in support of the assumption of monopoly or of a cartel in the credit mar-
ket. Cosimano and McDonald (1998) for example verify that public banks in
the USA respond to an unanticipated decline in the marginal costs of loans
with a much larger increase in the market value of equity. They show that
this would occur when the loan rate is priced above the marginal costs of
loan (feasible only in case of monopoly power). Moreover Beck et al. (2006)
report that the bank concentration index is very high (more than 70%) in
most of the countries they survey.
At a more general level however our result suggests that in a lemons
market, screening by subsidy may increase overall welfare and avoid mar-
7See Klein (1971) and Monti (1972).
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ket collapse. To be feasible however this policy need a monopolistic market
structure. In our opinion this contribution may open the road to more work
on how to avoid the worst consequences of adverse selection. An interesting
extension would be the possibility to compare the subsidy policy to an al-
ternative arrangement fee constructed in the form of a reverse pre-screening
mechanisms. Equally interesting is an extension to a moral hazard setting
where the least motivated entrepreneurs could be deterred from becoming
entrepreneurs more easily through a subsidy or a fee.
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4 Appendix
4.1 Appendix A: Proofs
A) Proof of eq. (5)
sep = pa

paya   pbyb
pa   pb

  (1  )

papb(yb   ya)
pa   pb

  L =
simplifying:
=
p2aya   papbyb + papbya   papbya   Lpa + Lpb
(pa   pb)
=
paya(pa   pb)  papb(yb   ya)  L(pa   pb)
(pa   pb) =
= paya   papb(yb   ya)
(pa   pb)   L = paya  G  L
B) Proof of (6):
We can show that:
paya(pa   pb)  L(pa   pb)  papb(yb   ya)
pa   pb > (paya   pbya) + pbya   L
[papbya   p2bya   L(pa   pb)]
(pa   pb) >
papbyb + p
2
bya   paL+ pbL
pa   pb
(L  pbya)(pa   pb)
(pa   pb) <
L(pa   pb)  papbyb + p2bya
pa   pb
 <
L(pa   pb) + p2bya   papbyb
(L  pbya)(pa   pb)
C) Proof of (8):
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sep = paya   papb(yb   ya)
(pa   pb)   L =
=
p2aya   papbya   paL+ pbL  papb(yb   ya)
(pa   pb) =
=
[(paya   L)(pa   pb)]  papb(yb   ya)
(pa   pb)
thus the proportion of good type (a) su¢ cient for positive prot in case
of separating is:
 >
papb(yb   ya)
(paya   L)(pa   pb)
which is equal to:
 >
G
(paya   L)
D) Proof of (9):
From (6) and (8), we can show that sep <  i¤:
papb(yb   ya)
(paya   L)(pa   pb) <
L(pa   pb) + p2bya   papbyb
(L  pbya)(pa   pb)
papb(yb   ya)
(pa   pb) <
[L(pa   pb) + p2bya   papbyb](paya   L)
(L  pbya)(pa   pb)
papbyb papbya < p
2
ayaL  paL2   papbyaL+ pbL2 + papby2a   p2byaL  p2apbyayb + papbybL
(L  pbya)
papbyb papbya < p
2
ayaL  paL2   p2apbyayb + papbybL
(L  pbya)  
papbya(L  pbya)
(L  pbya) +
pbL(L  pbya)
(L  pbya)
pb(payb   L) < paL(paya   L)  papbyb(paya   L)
(L  pbya)
pb(payb   L) < pa(paya   L)(L  pbyb)
(L  pbya)
Thus:
(payb   L)
(paya   L) <
pa
pb
(L  pbyb)
(L  pbya)
11
which can then be easily rewritten as (9).
E) Proof of (13):
Given (7) and (8), we can show that sep < pooling if and only if:
G
(paya   L) <
L  pbya
ya(pa   pb)
papb(yb   ya)
(pa   pb) <
(L  pbya) (paya   L)
ya(pa   pb)
pbyb <
payaL  L2 + pbyaL
paya
pbyb   L < pbyaL  L
2
paya
L  pbyb > L
2   pbyaL
paya
L  pbyb
L
>
L  pbya
paya
Thus as shown in (13):
L  pbyb
L  pbya >
L
paya
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4.2 Appendix B: Numerical Example
To illustrate quantitatively the signicance of subsidizing inactivity, we pro-
pose a numerical analysis. Our baseline exercise assumes that the project
succeeds with probability pa and pb respectively 0:7 and 0:3 while the gross
return y is 8 for the a good type and 9 for the b bad one. The size of the
loan L is equal to 4. The numerical simulation reports conditions on the
share of (good) entrepreneurs which are consistent with the general theoreti-
cal features proposed in this note. Specically we observe that when a share
 is higher than 0:5, then lenders prot in case of pooling (pooling) is posi-
tive. In the separating case according to the incentive constraints (eq. 3-4) ,
the threshold  required to realize positive prots (sep) is 0:32. A graphical
comparison of the two policies (in terms of expected returns) is proposed
below. First, this result suggests that under the values chosen there is no
possibility for a pooling contract when the share of good types is lower than
0:5, because the market collapses. Instead (as shown in the graph) if the
value is lower than 0:32 there is no space for any positive prot (pooling or
separating) contract. However in the case where  lies between 0:32 and 0:5;
the policy of subsidizing inactivity is protable for the bank (red line in the
gure) and it is also the only feasible protable contract. Further, applying
(6), we nd that the separating policy still dominates the pooling one even
in case of 0s higher than 0:5 until a  threshold of 0:67. From 0:67 on,
the proportion  of good entrepreneurs is so high that there is no need to
subsidize bad type to stay out (low level of cross-subsidization). In the gure
below we plot (only positive) prots for the pooling and the separating con-
tracts (respectively blue and red) against values of  , conrming the results
above.
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Figure A1. Monopolist prots with di¤erent policies
As regards the welfare comparison, the expected utility of an a type
in case of pooling is zero (the whole surplus is extracted due to the cross-
subsidization), while the expected utility of a b type is 0:3. These amounts
of surplus are reaped only in case the bank o¤ers the pooling contract, which
by the way occurs if  > 0:67: The surplus as a result of the o¤er of the
separating contracts is instead equal to 0:525 for both types (so they are
both better o¤ relative to the pooling case), and is actually realized for
0:32 <  < 0:67. In Figure A2 below we plotted the aggregate surplus in a
market with 100 potential entrepreneurs (N) against the proportion of good
entrepreneurs, . The red line is the maximum potential surplus attainable
under symmetric information (see eq 10), and is obtained assuming that only
good entrepreneurs carry out their projects. The broken blue line is obtained
calculating and summing up the welfare actually obtained by the three types
of agents, taking into account the contracts actually o¤ered by a prot max-
imizing monopolist bank at each value of  (see eqn.s 100). It is immediate
that the maximum potential surplus is realized only for intermediate values
of , where the monopolist bank o¤ers the separating contract. A competi-
tive bank can only o¤er the pooling contract for  > 0:5. In the Figure the
competitive welfare is the green line. Also in this case it is immediate that
it lies entirely below the welfare realized under monopoly.
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Figure A2. Surplus:potential and realized
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